Happy 117th, Dr. Van Til!

Today is the 117th birthday of Reformed theologian and apologist Cornelius Van TIil (1895-1987). Van Til is well known as a Christian thinker who wanted to hold forth the supremacy, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency of God above all things. His entire adult life was devoted to thinking through what Christian philosophy and apologetics would look like if they were consistent with a robust Reformed theology.

In honor of this day, I draw your attention to my 3 part introduction to Van Til’s thought: here, here, and here)

For those interested in learning more about Van Til’s life and thought, see the following (click on the picture for more information):

God and the Bible Go Together…Even in Apologetics

In the following quote Cornelius Van Til makes the important (and often overlooked or downright denied) point that a truly Christian argument (and by Christian here, I mean an argument that is faithful to the entirety of Scripture) for the Christian God is likewise, at the same time, an argument for the truth of the Christian Scriptures and our concept of revelation. If you lose one, you lose the other. If you establish the one you’ve established the other:

Incidentally we remark that our acceptance of the Scriptures does not depend upon our argument for the absolute God and our argument for the absolute God does not depend upon our acceptance of the Scriptures. We say that one does not depend upon the other because they are mutually involved in one another and quite inseparable. Our concept of God as absolute is a matter of fact taught nowhere but in Scripture. That is as we should expect, since Scripture itself is necessary because of man’s departure from the knowledge of God. Scripture is nothing but God’s self – testimony to the sinner as once God’s self – testimony came to man through man’s own consciousness and through God’s thought communication in paradise. Hence too it is only by his internal testimony in our hearts, that is, through the regeneration wrought by the Holy Spirit that we believe his own external testimony as it lies before us in scripture. (Cornelius Van Til, Psychology of Religion)

Take note of Van Til ties the personal revelation of God to Adam in the garden of Eden (“God’s thought communication in paradise”) with God’s revelation in the Bible. In both cases we find God’s personal address to humanity that conveys solid content (as opposed to merely “a relationship” or “encounter”). But he goes further to note that this disclosure of a) relationship and b) information was successful. It moved from being “out there” to “man’s consciousness.” This is precisely Paul’s point in Romans 1. Every person already has a “personal relationship” with God. The question is whether that relationship consists of knowing God as enemy or knowing him as Lord and friend.

Extra-Scriptural Information and the Supremacy of the Bible

Lately, I’ve been rereading John Frame’s 1976 article “Van Til: The Theologian” (originally published as “The Problem of Theological Paradox” in Foundations of Christian Scholarship) In the article, Frame expounds and expands on Cornelius Van Til’s distinctive contribution to Christian theology and apologetics (I’ve provided my own introductions to the major themes of Van Til’s thought here, here, and here). Frame’s article is a great read, and I hope to blog through a couple of sections both for the benefit of my readers as well of to clarify my own thoughts.

The following quotation is found on pg. 27 and discusses the use of extra-biblical material in the interpretation of Scripture. The balance between honoring extra-scriptural information on the one hand and honoring the supremacy of the Bible on the other is refreshing:

Even when we use extra-scriptural information (as we must) to understand Scripture, we must hold loosely to this information–loosely enough to allow Scripture to call it in question. It is only when our methods of Scripture interpretation are themselves purified by Scripture that real progress can be made in theology.

Leithart on Van Til

From Peter Leithart:

Based on a student’s questioning, I’m wondering whether “presuppositionalism” is the best term to describe what Vantillians are after. We don’t, after all, come up with some kind of set of axioms or theological idea “prior” to receiving revelation. We can talk about making the Triune God our “starting point” as much as we want, but faith in the Triune God is not in fact the “starting point” of our thinking (in either a chronological or logical sense). I like Frame’s revisionist view that “presuppositions” are really “basic commitments,” but that still seems to individualistic to me. I’d rather think of how we can ecclesiologize Van Til: Instead of saying that “all our thinking is grounded in the presupposition of the Triune God of Scripture,” we might say “as Christians we think and act from within the Church, which is the body of Christ and the community of worshipers of the Triune God.” This moves Van Til in the direction of postliberals and postmoderns, but that’s not a bad move in this case I think.

Food for Thought!

Van Til and Evidence

Recently, on a blog that I frequent the author made a familiar claim about Cornelius Van Til. Essentially the author’s point was that Van Til rejected the use of evidence for Christianity. in light of the paper i’m working on, I thought I should reply. Here’s what I wrote:

Dr. _________, thanks for the post, but sadly you insist on a misrepresentation on Van Til’s views that goes back nearly 40 years to Clark Pinnock’s entry in the book honoring Van Til, Jerusalem and Athens. You say that offering evidence for Christianity is inconsistant with being a presuppositionalist.

In the words of Van Til himself, “Accordingly I do not reject ‘the theistic proofs’ but merely insist on formulating them in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture. That is to say, if the theistic proof is constructed as it ought to be constructed, it is objectively valid, whatever the attitude of those to whom it comes may be.” (Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed. 197)

Here Van Til makes it clear that he does not reject theistic evidences. Thisn is not to deny that he rejects their presentation in a certain manner. That’s the issue of debate. But to insist that he rejects proof or evidence is to mishandle his Van Til’s words, as well as those of his interpreters (cf. Thom Notaro, Van Til and the use of Evidence).

Those that label themselves presuppositionalists yet reject the use of evidences are doing harm to Van Til’s project and have made something that was a major emphasis into the whole shabang.

Was Cornelius Van Til a Foundationalist?

One reoccurring critique by postmodernists is that the leading approach to epistemology during the modern period, classic foundationalism, is a hopelessly doomed project. Many Analytic philosophers have conceded the fact that foundationalism, in the sense critiqued by postmodernists, is not workable or realistic. Instead, in reponse to this critique, many epistemologists have proposed a modest foundationalism, one that opens up space for what is counted as a properly basic belief. Is Cornelius Van Til‘s epistemology subject to the postmodern critique of classic foundationalism? Is it even accurate to categorize Van Til’s position as foundationalist? I am tempted to say both yes and no.

First, we will examine how VT’s position is not foundationalist. Traditionally, classical foundationalism has appeared in at least 2 ways (though, in reality, there are literally dozens of ways of cutting the foundationalist pie). During the Enlightenment period, the two major warring parties of epistemological schools, the empiricists and the rationalists, despite their major differences, shared methodological commitments to this form of foundationalism. They sought some bedrock upon which their entire epistemological structures could be erected. The rationalists rooted their positions in clear, distinct, and indubitable ideas, while the empiricists looked to basic sense impressions on the “blank-slate” of human consciousness. If some aspect of human knowledge could be proven to be beyond doubt, self-evident and subject to open inquiry the trustworthiness of human knowledge would be maintained. The problem with this project, from a Van Tillian perspective, is that both schools seek an epistemic pou stou 1) apart from the God’s word, and 2) as a way of preserving sinful autonomy (i.e. intellectual independence from God and His authority).

Van Til clearly rejects this project and instead presents the self-attesting revelation of God in the scriptures as our epistemic bedrock. We should not look to anything in creation to ground knowledge, for no finite thing can provide epistemic certainty. Instead, despite our finitude and sin, we are to turn to scripture for guidance and be content with the supernatural certitude that comes only by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But does this leave us hopelessly agnostic, lacking any kind of confidence regarding the veracity of our knowing? No, Van Til was no relativist. Instead, he presents us with a theological framework for making sense of our everyday confidence in our cognitive faculties. This leads me to the affirmative aspect of my answer to our original question.

Is it even accurate to categorize Van Til’s position as foundationalist? Perhaps, but not in the sense open to postmodern criticism. Recall that classic foundationalism is an epistemological position. But, we’ve seen above that Van Til rejects the modernist’s notion of rooting certitude in anything in creation. Instead, we find our confidence in the living God. Van Til’s position is that knowledge is “saved” because God exists and we are created in His image (in fact for VT this fact is turned into a powerful theistic argument. For handy summary of VT’s “argument from unity of knowledge,” see James Anderson, “If Knowledge, then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til,” Calvin Theological Journal, April, 2005.).

God providentially guides and preserves our knowledge to an overwhelming great degree. Thus, for theological reasons, we can have confidence in our knowledge. But this is no onto-theological leap by which VT calls God into the picture simply to fill in the gaps of his philosophy. Instead, this lies at the very heart of VT’s philosophy. Functionally, because of our creationally constituted knowledge of God (what I’ve called p1 ), we are always, whether believer or not believer, in contact with God. But, the reason why VT’s epistemology escapes the barbs against modernist foundationalism is because, though we have metaphysical confidence, epistemologically we have no direct or unmediated knowledge of the world. We all have baggage, whether that manifests as misleading worldviews (p2), or inconsistent heart-commitments (p3). Of course, this is not to say that our situatedness in an inherent impediment against obtaining true knowledge (cf. Vern S. Poythress, God-Centered Biblical Interpretation-Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1999, pg. 66.), but it is against attaining to the impenetrable, philosophically certain knowledge that modernism sought. Secondly, how p1 plays out in our life is very difficult to express. It’s so common to our everyday experience that reflective contemplation of it is akin to a fish examining the water it swims in. Though this is a rough-and-ready term, perhaps we can call p1 a cognitive intuition.

Instead, we can categorize Van Til as a soft foundationalist, which is not open to postmodern critique. So, our confidence is in the power of God, and not our epistemic equipment. Let him who boasts, boast in the Lord.

Introduction to the Thought of Cornelius Van Til (Part 3)

Van Til on the nature and function of presuppositions. VT is commonly labeled the father of presuppositional apologetics. Though he was not the first to expound the idea, his rejection of autonomous thinking has left a lasting imprint upon Christian thinkers. Building off of the biblical teaching that no man can serve two masters (Matt. 6:24), he repudiated the thought that man, whether reborn by the Holy Spirit or not, can examine the world around him in isolation from prior determinative worldview considerations. Biblically speaking, the whole world is divided into two camps, those who love God, and those who do not. Neutral ground does not exist. To seek it would be a vain, sinful endeavor. Once a sinner has been regenerated by the Holy Spirit their ultimate heart commitment is to God. Christ Himself is both the power of God, and the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24).

For VT, presuppositions determine how we evaluate data. But what he meant by the term has not always been clearly understood. A “presupposition” can mean at least three things. He never explicitly makes this clear, but his usage of the term indicates subtle distinctions. According to the first usage, VT speaks of the underlying awareness of all people, irrespective of regeneration, regarding God. All people, in their “heart of hearts,” know God personally. They know that He exists, has created them for Himself, and requires that they live in a certain fashion (cf. Romans 1:18-32). This type of presupposition is inescapable, and no matter how hard fallen men try to suppress it, they can never quite shake it off. Sometimes they are less self-conscious of it, sometimes more so, but it never goes away. Calvin spoke of this as the “sense of deity” in all men. This usage of the term I will label P1. Knowledge of P1 serves as the metaphysical grounds for what VT spoke of as the “preconditions of intelligibility,” the necessary conditions to make any experience whatsoever intelligible. Second (P2), a presupposition can refer to the underlying system of belief that a person espouses, irrespective of regeneration. This is closely associated with what we think of as “worldview.” Lastly (P3), a presupposition can speak of the ultimate heart commitment of a person. The expression of this heart commitment need not be explicitly or formally religious.

This account of presuppositions leads to the inescapable conclusion that unbelievers operate with two antithetic presuppositions, one that acknowledges God, and the other that denies His epistemic Lordship. By way of contrast, we can see that Christians, by virtue 1) of their creation in God’s image (P1), and 2) because of the redemptive light of scripture and their possession of the Holy Spirit, acknowledge that God is sovereign and the Lord over all (P2). A unified field of knowledge is possible for Christians because both P1 and P2 coinhere, whereas the exact opposite is the case for non-Christians. VT never denied that unbelievers thought logically, reasoned well, or lived moral lives. His pricipal objection to unbelief was (in my language) that only when P1 (the preconditions of intelligibility) is rooted in the triune God of scripture, as it is in Christianity, can the house of knowledge be properly structured. No matter how elaborate a system of unbelief man construes (P2), without rationality, probability, logic, and the uniformity of nature systemically accounted for (P1), all is in vain. Unless the Lord build the house, the workers toil in vain.

Now, let us consider P2. While Christians, because of P1, know God, they nevertheless do not always develop a Biblically faithful worldview. They may know that God is sovereign and King of all things (P1), but their system of interpretation (P2) may prohibit them from putting flesh on that concept, because it cannot account for it. Another example might help. VT often charged Arminians with systemic inconsistency. They hold that God is the ruler of all things (P1), and rightly so, because He is! Yet, their theological system (P2) removes from God the right to turn people’s hearts towards Himself in grace. Their system (P2) doesn’t account for, or render intelligible, their (legitimate) practice of intercessory prayer (based on P1).

Introduction to the Thought of Cornelius Van Til (Part 2)

We now continue with our survey of the key concepts in the thought of Cornelius Van Til.

Reality and revelation. Because this universe is the creation of the all-wise God of scripture, everything in it bears eloquent testimony to his character and wisdom. Truly, the “heavens are telling of the glory of God.” God is not known simply at the end of a syllogism. Every fact of the universe directs us back to its source. Van Til speaks of reality in this fashion:

Created reality may be compared to a great estate. The owner has his name plainly and indelibly written at unavoidable places. How then would it be possible for some stranger to enter the estate, make researches in it, and then fairly say that in these researches he need not and cannot be confronted with the question of ownership? To change the figure, compare the facts of nature and history, the facts with which the sciences are concerned, to a linoleum that has its figure indelibly imprinted. The pattern of such a linoleum cannot be effaced till the linoleum itself is worn away. Thus inescapably does the scientist meet the pattern of Christian theism in each fact with which he deals.

God’s interpretation of reality fixes the ontological structure of the universe. All of it is fully known and ever-present to God’s awareness. Just as in Genesis God speaks to the waters and tells them “you can go no further,” so His determination of creation fixes any ontological free-play. In all of this, man is not ignorant, for God’s wisdom, divine nature, and sovereignty over times and seasons are made known to him.

Man’s epistemological responsibility. Flowing from his teaching on the self-contained nature of God and the semiotic structure of reality is Van Til’s position on human nature and our epistemic responsibilities that follow. While Van Til affirms the biblical record that our first parents were created imago Dei, he moves beyond simply affirming the indicative aspect of this design, and focuses in closely on its imperative dimension. Man’s thought is a replica of God’s thought, but it is a finite image, insufficient to function as its own self-attesting authority. Adam, even in paradise, needed to make the voice of his creator the canon for his interpretive life.

Van Til’s two-circle epistemology. God’s analytical knowledge is self-attesting and acts as the objective structure of reality. This is God’s authoritative interpretation of creation (I’ll call this AI1). God’s interpretation of reality is unique to Him because only he comprehends all the facts and their relations. Nevertheless, man can have true knowledge. This knowledge is attained by creatures that submit to His revelation and “think God’s thoughts after Him.” Such servant-knowledge is pro mensura humana, knowledge fit for a creature, or what Van Til called analogical interpretation (AI2). On the lower circle, AI2 is spoken of as creaturely reconstruction of God’s original interpretation. Thus, the world is not a tabula rasa, a blank tablet whose meaning is ultimately deciphered by man.

Introduction to the Thought of Cornelius Van Til

Because so much of what is said on this blog is undergirded and rooted in the thought of Cornelius Van Til, I thought it would be a good time to finally give my readers a more formal introduction to his contribution to both Christian theology and apologetics/worldview. These entries will be a bit longer than my usual posts, so please bear with me.

Dr. Van Til (1895-1987) was Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Seminary from 1929 to 1972. Raised squarely in the Reformed tradition, Van Til cut his theological teeth on the Three Forms of Unity. Much of his approach to both theology and apologetics was greatly shaped by several leading Reformed theologians, from the Dutch wing of Reformed thought, Herman Bavinck, Louis Berkhof, and Abraham Kuyper, and from the Princtonian American tradition, B. B. Warfield and Charles Hodge. Though he differed from them at crucial points, his approach was essentially an outworking of what he believed were their most penetrating insights. He sought to correct what he believed to be their inconsistencies and follow the path they pointed out but never quite walked. For instance, Van Til’s critiques Warfield’s approach to apologetics often noted that Warfield wasn’t consistent with his biblical anthropology.

Several key themes, or master motifs, dominate Van Til’s thought. If one can master these central concepts, much of his work will open up with greater ease. For the purposes of this series, I have selected only a few of these themes. Here we’ll examine Van Til’s (VT) teaching concerning the nature of God, his doctrine of creation and providence, and his biblical anthropology (with it’s corollary regarding the function of Scripture).

God, the all-sufficient. For VT, a genuinely Christian philosophy must first properly hammer out its doctrine of God. If this essential task fails, all else is doomed. The chief principle in VT’s doctrine of God is what Frame calls “God’s self-contained fullness.” In rooting all things in God, VT, following Scripture, stresses God’s independence from anything in His creation. In VT’s words,

Basic to all the doctrines of Christian theism is that of the self-contained God, or, if we wish, that of the ontological Trinity. (The Defense of the Faith [Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1975], 100.)

And,

A truly Christian philosophy should, it seems to us, begin with the notion of God as self-contained.” “We must take the notion of the self-contained, self-sufficient God as the most basic notion of all our interpretative efforts. ( Christianity and Idealism (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1955), 85)

And lastly,

A truly Christian philosophy should, it seems to us, begin with the notion of God as self-contained. (Ibid., 88.)

In fact, VT finds that this concept of a completely self-sufficient God, one in need of nothing to define either His character or attributes, is completely original to Christianity. He states, “There is no speculative system that entertains the idea of such a self-contained God. It is only the Scriptures which teach us about this God.” (The Triumph of Grace [no publication data, 1958], 28)

God’s plurality does not depend any contrast between Him and creation, for within the Trinity, the persons of the godhead are clearly distinct from one another. Thus, unity and plurality exist in God, without the need of creation to introduce this distinction. Neither is God’s goodness anything that He is dependant upon outside of his own nature.

All of this though, ties in quite consistently with Van Til’s two-circle metaphysic. According to Frame:

Over and over again in class he would draw two circles on the blackboard: a large circle representing God and a smaller circle below it representing the creation. The two were connected by lines representing providence and revelation, but Van Til emphasized the distinctness of the two circles from one another. He insisted that Christianity has a “two-circle” worldview, as opposed to secular thought, which only has “one circle” thinking. Nonbiblical thought makes all reality equal: if there is a God, he is equal to the world. But for Christianity, God is the sovereign Creator and Lord: The world is in no sense equal to him. This is, in essence, the “simple structure” of Van Til’s thought. (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, 53)

Nearly every additional point in Van Til’s system is an outworking of this crucial distinction, if you get this you’re half way to understanding VT.

Clearing Up Common Misunderstandings of Van Tillian (Presuppositional) Apologetics

The approach to apologetics that I take on this blog is greatly shaped by Cornelius Van Til (you’ll see me mention him time and again in passing, for this I ask your forgiveness. So many of my best thoughts were first his and John Frame’s.) For those of you that are aware of the issues tied into presuppositional apologetics you’ll be familiar with the fact that there is a standard list of objections to Van Til’s apologetic approach. Here are some great works defending and explaining Van Til’s actual method in light of these objections.

Van Til FEMs (Frequently Encountered Misconceptions)- James N. Anderson

Common Misunderstandings of Van Til’s Apologetics, Part 1 and 2- Richard L. Pratt