Plantinga and Presuppositionalism, part 3

Here I get a little more into my thought of Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology:

Thanks for your notes on Plantinga. I read them and think that you summarize the issues and his concerns well.  I must admit though, that I feel that Van Tillian presuppositionalism does a better job as an apologetic methodology.

Of course this is not a slight on your presentation of Reformed Epistemology in your handout. You presented the issues perfectly. While Plantinga does demonstrate that most of our beliefs are build upon induction [reasoning from the particular to the general] rather than deduction [reasoning from the general to the particular], I still believe that belief in God is more than “properly basic.” [properly basic beliefs do not depend for their justification on other beliefs. For a detailed presentation of Platinga's view, in his own words, click here]

Is Belief in God properly basic? Yes, it is. But such knowledge is also necessary for understanding the world around us. For instance, Plantinga himself begs the question of God when he states “God made our minds in such and such a fashion.” I’m sure you’re aware of this.

First, demonstrating that a belief is basic, doesn’t mean it’s true (the Great Pumpkin example). And apologetics is more than about rationality, it’s about truth. If Charlie Brown’s friend Linus does have an “incorrigible” experience that he feels is of the Great Pumpkin, isn’t it, On Plantinga’s grounds, a properly basic belief? My thoughts are that Reformed Epistemology simply is a defensive apologetic, one that simply intends to guard Christians from the label “irrational.”

Of course Christianity is not irrational. But as Van Til said, when we defend our faith our goal is not to present Christianity as just as good as other beliefs, or even perhaps even better intellectually and more consistent than other worldviews. Rather Christianity is the only worldview that does not make nonsense out of reason and experience. It is the only worldview worth having.

Second, because a belief is properly basic, as Plantinga defines it (that is to say, you are within your cognitive rights to believe such a thing), does not mean that it provides us with the preconditions of intelligibility.  I wouldn’t want to give the idea to the unbeliever that his ultimate beliefs are rational, regarding the nature of reality. Without a Christian theistic understanding of the world the unbeliever cannot consistently account for   objective notions of beauty, human dignity and value, and truth, let alone tons of other more detailed philosophical issues. My approach to apologetics and a defense of the faith is one that attempts to display all of the world, and our seemingly “common” experiences as under the control and providence of the God.

Sometimes I feel like Platinga has set the apologetic bar too low. But that’s just me.

On a positive note, I do understand that Plantinga is most likely attempting to set up a defense for the kind of people (the average “simple Christian” and the like) who can’t offer a detailed explanation for their faith. God does grant people the gift of faith, yet they cannot present strong philosophical arguments for Christian theism, and I would be a fool if I didn’t acknowledge that. Ronald Nash has noted that the best way to employ Platinga’s work is as a negative apologetics that responds to those who would seek to shut down conversation with Christianity because, a priori, it is deemed irrational. Here RE is helpful is clearing way the objection, making room for a fuller apologetic strategy.

Here’s a very helpful analysis and contrast between Van Til and Platinga, see the following article by James Anderson. For more on Plantinga’s and Van Til’s view on apologetics and epistemology, see:

Plantinga and Presuppositionalism, Part 2

For those of you who read the first part of this email, you’ll notice that I’m laying out the basic Van Tillian approach to apologetics with little explanation of Plantinga’s approach. Be Patient!  Here I finish up my presentation. My email continues:

The next thing you said was, “you need to show that the ability to reason can only fit within a specifically Christian view (not Islamic, not Jewish, but Christian).”  I understand this to be a problem for the presuppositionist, but not necessarily one that cannot be overcome. How do I display in my argumentation that the God I seek to show forth is not simply any god, but rather the Christian understanding of God, as revealed in Jesus Christ? Well, There are several different angles that I would approach this from. A full-orbed approach could never be done in a single apologetics encounter. But if I were writing a book perhaps I would show how Christianity (to use a Van Tillian phrase) is a unit, a whole, a package deal. This would naturally lead me to discuss how the major doctrines of the Christian worldview are inter-related, and mutually presuppose one another.

 Perhaps I would take the time to show that a simple, Unitarian understanding of God (such as the Muslims and Jews have) makes the display of His attributes dependant on His creation (contra the Christian position. Ex. Inter-trinitarian love) thus demonstrating that they’re understanding of the Godhead-since the close of the NT- does not provide us with a self-sufficient God, logically denying His self-suffientcy. Maybe I might simply, and more pragmatically, state that if the preconditions for rationality are provided to us from the whole of Scripture, both OT and NT, then we should see what all of Scripture says about God (demonstrating from Scripture that God is Triune, using the historical proof-texts and exegesis).

Though, for those philosophically more inclined I would state that the Christian understanding of God, contra the Muslim and Jewish understanding, provides us with a sound and consistent basis for solving the historic philosophical problem of the one and many. That is, the nature of the Creator Himself (Triune) explains how universal principles and classifications can exist (being that they are abstract, non-physical things) without destroying the individuality of the particulars. Yet at the same time avoiding the error of strict empiricism in which all we are left with are individual, non-connected observations without any groups or categories in which to place them (I believe this is Van Til’s whole point about the unbeliever’s problem of predication). God’s very essence, being both one and many, explains how the harmony of these two points can coexist.

I believe that this is a sound philosophical reason for understanding that the Christian God (or should I say, the Christian understanding of God) provides us with a good reason for accepting truths discovered by both rational and sense perception. Thus the Christian understanding of God solves a basic epistemological problem.

Lastly, you said, “There’s a difference between making an assertion and making an argument.” Of course I whole-heartedly agree. It is my hope that in this letter I’ve successfully made my position a bit clearer, showing that what I said in my last email was not simply an assertion, but an argument (if only worked out in a thumbnail sketch). If there remains any questions about how I presented my case, please feel free to ask. I love the dialogue! I’ve never intended to merely assert my position, but rather given carefully reasoned answers for my view. Trust me, fideism is not pleasing to me! Hope to hear from you soon.

In the next few posts I’ll interact a bit more with Plantinga.

Plantinga and Presuppositionalism, Part 1

The following is an email conversation I had several years ago with a highly respected friend and thinker. We were discussing the relationship between the religious epistemology of Alvin Plantinga and the presuppositionalism of Cornelius Van Til. I’ll break  it up into smaller parts, because the original emails were quite long.

Warning: You’re joining the conversation mid-stream. Overall though, I think you’ll be able to follow what’s being said:

Dear, _____. Thanks for replying so quickly.

Regarding a comment I had previously made you said, “Remember that Plantinga is an analytic philosopher and in this tradition every conclusion has to be established by very good arguments.” Of course I’m in full agreement with you on this one. I would not go as for as the evidentialists, but I do say that we need to have good reasons for believing the things that we do. [ Many evidentialists believe without good reasons we should cease holding a given belief]  Now, you say this to set up your next point, which is, “In analytic philosophy you cannot simply make the assertion, ‘the very fact that we reason, presupposes the God of the Bible,’ you have to actually present a good argument that would show that the conclusion is true.”

Here is where I felt the need to reply. My comments were never intended to say something like “the very fact that we reason, presupposes the God of the Bible.” Of course, I believe that this is a true statement, but it’s not what I would offer as “evidence” for my position. Without qualifying the statement- though as we as Christian may believe it to be true- this would sound like sheer fideism. This would almost be as bad as an argument , “The Bible is the word of God because the Bible says it’s the word of God” (a vicious  circle to be sure!).

I believe that the presuppostionalist’s transcendental argument is a very clear and indeed a “good argument.” For instance, the transcendental argument doesn’t simply say that “”the very fact that we reason, presupposes the God of the Bible.” (Well, it does say that. But I would say the goal of the argument is to show this point. But the claim isn’t the argument itself).  The framework for the argument is this: We as creatures of God have a built in knowledge of our Creator. Yet, in light of the Fall, the Bible states that we suppress that truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18). Though many people act of though God does not exist, their everyday actions actually prove that they do. For instance, the infinite person God of Scripture is the only logical and coherent ground for laws of thoughts, the uniformity of nature (the very heart and soul and the scientific method.), dignity for humanity, love, and moral absolutes. As our actions assume such beliefs, we can be said to know them.

Though I could go into this further, I can’t due to time constraints. Needless to say, all other worldviews cannot consistently make sense of the above mentioned conditions for meaning and purpose. No other worldview or epistemology (though of course, one’s epistemology will largely be determined by one’s metaphysic and vice-versa) can provide us will the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.  Many, if not all, objections to the Christian metaphysic will involve question-begging, double standards, arbitrariness, and inconsistencies in argumentation. And, depending of one’s worldview we would have to apply the TAG a bit differently. Ultimately, as Dr. Bahnsen used to say, we argue for the truth of the Christian worldview from the impossibility of the contrary.

More to come…

Interview on Presuppositional Apologetics

On  Thursday, July 2nd, I’ll be discussing the topic of presuppositional apologetics on Trinity Talk with Uri and Jarrod.

Uri and I have known each other for several years now. We’ve worked together and attended seminary together. Now he’s a pastor, and i’m a professor. We have our theological disagreements, but we both love discussing them as iron sharpens iron.

In the interview we’ll be talking about something that’s view close to our hearts, a robust, powerful, and God-glorifying way of defending the faith. Here’s a sample of the kind of questions we’ll discuss:

a) What is apologetics?
b) What is presuppositional apologetics?
c) How does presuppositionalism differ with other apologetic positions?
d) How does a presuppositional apologetics answer charges from atheism?

Clearing Up Common Misunderstandings of Van Tillian (Presuppositional) Apologetics

The approach to apologetics that I take on this blog is greatly shaped by Cornelius Van Til (you’ll see me mention him time and again in passing, for this I ask your forgiveness. So many of my best thoughts were first his and John Frame’s.) For those of you that are aware of the issues tied into presuppositional apologetics you’ll be familiar with the fact that there is a standard list of objections to Van Til’s apologetic approach. Here are some great works defending and explaining Van Til’s actual method in light of these objections.

Van Til FEMs (Frequently Encountered Misconceptions)- James N. Anderson

Common Misunderstandings of Van Til’s Apologetics, Part 1 and 2- Richard L. Pratt

John Frame on the Basics

PRESUPPOSITIONAL APOLOGETICS: AN INTRODUCTION

Part 1 of 2: Introduction and Creation

Part 2 of 2: Fall and Redemption; and Summary and Conclusion

Articles by Michael R. Butler

Michael Butler is one of the finest Christian apologists in the presuppositionalist school of thought. On his blog, he has posted some really great articles that develop some of the material one can find here.

1. The Pulling Down of Strongholds: The Power of Presuppositional Apologetics (Apologetics)

2. The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence (Philosophical Apologetics)

3. A Truly Reformed Epistemology (Philosophical Apologetics)

A Great New Resource for Apologetics

I just picked up this new work on a Reformed approach to apologetics, Revelation and Reason, and it looks wonderful! I’m currently finishing up Total Truth by Nancy Pearcey, but when I’m done, i’m jumping right into this one!

Table of Contents:

Introduction. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton

(1) Reformed Apologetics: Exegetical Considerations
(a) Some Epistemological Reflections on I Cor. 2:6-13. Richard B. Gaffin
(b) Resurrection, Proof, and Presuppositionalism: Acts 17:30-31. Lane G. Tipton
(c) The Irrationality of Unbelief: An Exegetical Study. K. Scott Oliphint
(d) The Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics. Moises Silva
(e) Paul’s Christological Interpretation of Creation and Presuppositional Apologetics. Lane G. Tipton

(2) Reformed Apologetics: Theological Foundations
(a) Divine Aseity and Apologetics. John M. Frame
(b) Consistently Reformed: The Inheritance and Legacy of Van Til’s Apologetic. Michael S. Horton
(c) A Confessional Apologetic. Thom Notaro
(d) Theologia Naturalis: A Reformed Tradition. Jeffrey K. Jue
(e) The Eschatological Implications of Genesis 2:15 for Apologetics. Bill Dennison

(3) Reformed Apologetics: Methodological Implications
(a) The Old New Reformed Epistemology. K. Scott Oliphint
(b) The Fate of Apologetics in an Age of Normal Nihilism. Michael Payne
(c) Turn! Turn! Turn! Reformed Apologetics and the Cultural Dimension. William Edgar
(d) Van Til and Transcendental Argument. Don Collett

APPENDIX
Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian Apologetics. K. Scott Oliphint