Was Cornelius Van Til a Foundationalist?
One reoccurring critique by postmodernists is that the leading approach to epistemology during the modern period, classic foundationalism, is a hopelessly doomed project. Many Analytic philosophers have conceded the fact that foundationalism, in the sense critiqued by postmodernists, is not workable or realistic. Instead, in reponse to this critique, many epistemologists have proposed a modest foundationalism, one that opens up space for what is counted as a properly basic belief. Is Cornelius Van Til’s epistemology subject to the postmodern critique of classic foundationalism? Is it even accurate to categorize Van Til’s position as foundationalist? I am tempted to say both yes and no.
First, we will examine how VT’s position is not foundationalist. Traditionally, classical foundationalism has appeared in at least 2 ways (though, in reality, there are literally dozens of ways of cutting the foundationalist pie). During the Enlightenment period, the two major warring parties of epistemological schools, the empiricists and the rationalists, despite their major differences, shared methodological commitments to this form of foundationalism. They sought some bedrock upon which their entire epistemological structures could be erected. The rationalists rooted their positions in clear, distinct, and indubitable ideas, while the empiricists looked to basic sense impressions on the “blank-slate” of human consciousness. If some aspect of human knowledge could be proven to be beyond doubt, self-evident and subject to open inquiry the trustworthiness of human knowledge would be maintained. The problem with this project, from a Van Tillian perspective, is that both schools seek an epistemic pou stou 1) apart from the God’s word, and 2) as a way of preserving sinful autonomy (i.e. intellectual independence from God and His authority).
Van Til clearly rejects this project and instead presents the self-attesting revelation of God in the scriptures as our epistemic bedrock. We should not look to anything in creation to ground knowledge, for no finite thing can provide epistemic certainty. Instead, despite our finitude and sin, we are to turn to scripture for guidance and be content with the supernatural certitude that comes only by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But does this leave us hopelessly agnostic, lacking any kind of confidence regarding the veracity of our knowing? No, Van Til was no relativist. Instead, he presents us with a theological framework for making sense of our everyday confidence in our cognitive faculties. This leads me to the affirmative aspect of my answer to our original question.
Is it even accurate to categorize Van Til’s position as foundationalist? Perhaps, but not in the sense open to postmodern criticism. Recall that classic foundationalism is an epistemological position. But, we’ve seen above that Van Til rejects the modernist’s notion of rooting certitude in anything in creation. Instead, we find our confidence in the living God. Van Til’s position is that knowledge is “saved” because God exists and we are created in His image (in fact for VT this fact is turned into a powerful theistic argument. For handy summary of VT’s “argument from unity of knowledge,” see James Anderson, “If Knowledge, then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til,” Calvin Theological Journal, April, 2005.).
God providentially guides and preserves our knowledge to an overwhelming great degree. Thus, for theological reasons, we can have confidence in our knowledge. But this is no onto-theological leap by which VT calls God into the picture simply to fill in the gaps of his philosophy. Instead, this lies at the very heart of VT’s philosophy. Functionally, because of our creationally constituted knowledge of God (what I’ve called p1 ), we are always, whether believer or not believer, in contact with God. But, the reason why VT’s epistemology escapes the barbs against modernist foundationalism is because, though we have metaphysical confidence, epistemologically we have no direct or unmediated knowledge of the world. We all have baggage, whether that manifests as misleading worldviews (p2), or inconsistent heart-commitments (p3). Of course, this is not to say that our situatedness in an inherent impediment against obtaining true knowledge (cf. Vern S. Poythress, God-Centered Biblical Interpretation-Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1999, pg. 66.), but it is against attaining to the impenetrable, philosophically certain knowledge that modernism sought. Secondly, how p1 plays out in our life is very difficult to express. It’s so common to our everyday experience that reflective contemplation of it is akin to a fish examining the water it swims in. Though this is a rough-and-ready term, perhaps we can call p1 a cognitive intuition.
Instead, we can categorize Van Til as a soft foundationalist, which is not open to postmodern critique. So, our confidence is in the power of God, and not our epistemic equipment. Let him who boasts, boast in the Lord.
