The Problem of Evil (Part 4)

The Deductive Problem of Evil (hereafter DPE) is probably the most well known form of de jure objections to Christianity, i.e. it challenges the very rationality of our faith. The classic presentation of this argument is from the pen of David Hume,

Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. It is from the intention of the deity? But her is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so the clear, so decisive… (Quoted in Platinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, pg. 10.)

The best known contemporary formulation was argued by J. L. Mackie. According to Mackie, “…it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positive irrational, that the essential parts of the theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another.” ( “Evil and Omnipotence,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell. London: Oxford, 1971, pg. 92) This is a serious charge. And if true, it undermines the very credibility of the Christian faith at its very core. But what is the DPE, formally stated? According to Ronald Nash, “[t]he problem arises because of a supposed contradiction that lies in the following six propositions:

1) God exists
2) God is omnipotent
3) God is omniscient
4) God is omnibenevolent
5) God created the world
6) Evil exists”
(Taken from “The Problem of Evil,” To Everyone an Answer: A Case for the Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004, pg. 214)

There is said to be something contradictory about one individual holding all these points at the same time. The argument has also been formulated in this way manner:

1) If God is good and loves all human beings, it is reasonable to believe that He wants to deliver the creatures he loves from evil and suffering.

2) If God is all-knowing, it is reasonable to believe that He knows how to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering.

3) If God is all-powerful, it is reasonable to believe that He is able to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering. (Taken from Nash, Worldviews in Conflict. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992, pg. 94)

But Alvin Plantinga has pointed out that nothing in the syllogism constrains us to believed that Christian theism is rationally unwarranted. Nothing here leads us to believed that Christians hold to a contradiction. Perhaps if the proposition “God must stop evil as soon as it happens” is inserted the atheologians goal is achieved. But no Christian holds this.

In order for the non-Christian objector to successfully argue the DPE, they must insert a proposition that contradicts the others, and one that Christians affirm. Plantinga has found a proposition that all Christian affirm, and that once and for all precludes the possibility of the DPE hitting its mark. The proposition is “God created a world that now contains evil and had a good reason for doing so.” The DPE is now solved:

1) God exists
2) God is omnipotent
3) God is omniscient
4) God is omnibenevolent
5) God created a world that now contains evil and had a good reason for doing so
6) Evil exists

Christians affirm all these points and find no contradiction. In light of Plantinga’s treatment, Mackie himself conceded that the DPE “does not, after all, shows that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.” (The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pg. 154)

Next we’ll look at a standard Christian response to the PE, the free will defense…