According to Pattern: Joseph (Part 2)

Now, let’s see how in the story of Jesus, God is retelling the story of Joseph in a dramatic new way.

Jesus is the ultimate son of Jacob/Israel (Matt. 1:1, Rom. 9:5), and the full and final fulfillment of the ’seed’ of Abraham (Gal. 3:16) and the serpent-crushing ’seed’ of the woman in Gen. 3:15.

Jesus is given preeminence above his brothers by God the Father (Heb. 2:11), and is the firstborn of all creation (Col. 1:15). As the climactic descendant from the royal line of David He is also the firstborn in the sense of Kingship (Matt. 27:11, Rom. 1:3).

Jesus is persecuted by his brethren and suffers “exile” (“the curse of the Law”, Gal. 3:13) for His people (2 Cor. 5:21).

Jesus is falsely accused and is silent when reviled (Acts 8:32, 1 Pet. 2:23).

Jesus is the suffering servant, and as a result of his humiliation is later exalted (Isa. 52-53, Phil. 2:5-11).

Jesus becomes a source of life, not only for the people of Israel, but also for the surrounding pagan nations (Isa. 49:6, 52:10, Rev. 7:4-10).

The parallels are clearly seen once you do a little digging. Joseph serves as a historical prefiguring of Jesus. Or, put another way, Jesus repeats the essential acts of Joseph’s life, but on a cosmic scale.

Joseph was great, but a greater than Joseph has come!

According to Pattern: Joseph

Have you ever noticed just how much the story of Jacob’s son, Joseph, is a type (i.e. a historical prefiguring and pattern) of Jesus? Actually, it’s pretty amazing. Let’s take a quick run through to see the ways in which the life and story of Joseph sets a pattern for a servant of God that Jesus fulfills.

First, let’s refamiliarize ourselves with the story of Joseph.

Joseph is the son of Jacob (Israel), and the ’seed’ of Abraham (Gen. 37:2).

Joseph is given preeminence above his brothers by his father, and treated as his firstborn (Gen. 37:3).

Joseph is persecuted by his brethren and is taken into “exile” (Gen. 37:18-36).

Joseph is falsely accused and is silent when reviled (Gen. 39:6-20).

Joseph is a servant and later is exalted (Gen. 39:1-6, 41:37-45).

Joseph becomes a source of life, not only for the people of Israel, but also for the surrounding pagan nations (Gen. 41:56-57, 42:1-3, 50:15-21).

Next we’ll look at how in Jesus the full theological freight of Joseph’s story is unfolded in Israel’s Messiah…

In the Flesh (Part 2 of 2)

Now let’s pick up where we left off, describing exactly what it meant for God to come in the flesh.

In the incarnation, God’s covenant promises find their fulfillment. The promise that God would be with His people is brought to pass with the coming of Immanuel (Matt. 1:22-23), “God with us.” Likewise, in Christ we find the “latter days” seed of the woman (Gen. 3:15) who brings all of the miraculous birth stories found In the Old Testament to their crescendo. Just think about it. In God’s mysterious working in history, a major mark of His work was providing “miracle” babies for women who could have no children (ex: Sarah and Rachel in Genesis, Samson’s mom in Judges, and Hannah in 1 Samuel). When we find that the Holy One of God was born from young Jewish bride-to-be who had never had sex we’re totally floored! This is the ultimate “miracle” baby! But a second reflection and we realize that this is God’s calling card: It had to be this way!

When Christ was in the womb of the Virgin Mary, He was filled with the Spirit, a foretaste of the Spirit poured out on all people in the New Covenant (cf. Jer. 36).

In order for Christ to serve as a substitute for His people, he could not bear the guilt and corruption of Adam (i.e. He could not be stained by Original Sin). One that Himself needs redemption cannot act as the sinless sacrifice for others. So, in the incarnation there is both continuity and discontinuity. There is continuity because (as mentioned earlier) he does not break the natural chain of motherhood, causing an ex nihilo new creation. God doesn’t hit the “reset button,” but instead works from within the already existing structures of the world He created (motherhood).

Yet, there is discontinuity because Christ does not have a natural father, and is conceived by the Holy Spirit. Because of His conception and empowerment by the Spirit, Christ is an obedient Son to the Father. He cannot sin because He lives to do the will of the Father, and in fact always does so. The trials and temptations that Adam (in Gen. 3) and Israel (in their wilderness wandering) underwent, Christ also passes through, but unlike them, He is successful and obedient where they failed (cf. Rom. 8:3, John 3:6a).

One the consequences of the incarnation (among others) is that Christ introduces into the fallen world a new way of being human, the Son way. Christ is the image of God par excellance, and the redeemed are to be conformed to His image. While we are children by adoption, and Christ is God’s eternal Son. We are to bear the image of the “man from Heaven” (1 Cor. 15:49). This filial bond between Jesus and the Father is extended to Christ’s brothers (Heb. 2).

In closing, unless Christ assumes a fully human nature, humanity cannot be saved. Just as sin entered the world through one man (Rom. 5), so the resurrection of the dead comes through a man…Christ Jesus (1 Cor. 15).

In the Flesh (Part 1 of 2)

The subject of the next 2 blog entries is the Bible’s teaching on Christ and His Incarnation. Why is this even worth discussing? First, we note that the doctrine of the incarnation is central to the Christian gospel. Why? As several of the Church Fathers noted, anything that God did not assume is not redeemed. In Christ, the Father has provided us with the perfect mediator, and the One who institutes the New Covenant.

Before we continue to discuss the nature and consequences of the incarnation, an important clarification must be made. We shouldn’t assume that we know who is being incarnated, so discussing that is helpful. We need to know Who Jesus is before we can talk of His coming to earth in the flesh. The One being carried in Mary’s womb, the One wrapped in swaddling clothes in a manger, is none other than the divine Second Person of the Holy Trinity, very God of very God, consubstantial (of the same substance) with the Father, begotten, not made, God the Son (cf. the Nicene Creed). Without a distinctively Trinitarian understanding of God the incarnation just doesn’t make sense, or, without one, our explanations veer off into heresy. The Father sends the Son; the Son comes in the flesh to redeem creation, and the Son is conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary by the Holy Spirit.

In the incarnation, the divine Son enters into his humiliation, and takes the form of a bondservant in order to fulfill the role of The Servant of the Lord (cf. Isa. 52-53 and Phil. 2). This is accomplished not by the Son emptying Himself of His divine attributes (He did not cease to be God.), but by taking on a fragile human nature (again, see Phil. 2. See also Jn. 1:14, and Gal. 4:4), and by withholding the free exercise of His divine prerogatives. The Son maintains a mysterious bond between His divine and human natures (what theologians refers to as the “hypostatic union”). Yet these natures are not confused, mixed, or altered in any way, Christ is always one person with two natures (contra early errors taught by guys like Nestorius, Apollinaris, and Eutyches.)

Likewise, the incarnation presents us with what might very well be the best example of God’s plan of redeeming the created order, rather than starting from scratch (i.e. the redemption of creation, not from creation). Christ’s human nature was not created ex nihilo (“from nothing”) as Adam’s was (well sort of, he was made from the dirt); He was born of a woman (Gal. 4:4), and had a mother just as all other humans do. Neither did He pass through Mary, like water does through a pipe. Adoptionism is ruled out, because the Father did not simply choose an existing man to indwell, but instead commissioned His Son to actually take the form of a human being, indwelt by the Spirit of God.

Next we’ll continue and conclude our little exploration into the wonderful world of incarnational Christology (big words, big words…).

Perspectivalism 101

John M. Frame has brilliantly formulated what I believe is an extraordinary biblical epistemology in his book, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (henceforth DKG). In this work Frame develops what he calls triperspectivalism, or multiperspectivalism (the truth is that if you can pronounce either of these terms properly, you’re halfway to mastery!). Now, what I’d like to do it walk my read through an explanation of what Frame is doing here, and why is helpful to the thought-life of a Christian.

In any and every act of knowing something we are in constant contact with three things, or as Frame calls them, three perspectives. These three perspectives are 1) the person doing the knowing (what we call the “knowing subject”), 2) the thing being known (i.e. the object of knowledge), and 3) the standard or criteria by which knowledge is attained. In knowing each of these we actually know the other two. Each are interrelated to the others in such a fashion that each could be seen as a perspective on the whole knowing process.

Here’s an example of how these perspectives are connected (though I realize that it probably raises further questions). Let’s take the example of me getting to know my nephew’s dog, Rusty. Perhaps I’ve come to the conclusion that Rusty is a short-haired dog. How does this talk of “perspectives” relate to this act of knowing? Well, first there’s the subject of knowledge, that’s me. Second, there’s the object of knowledge, that’s Rusty and his coat of fur. Third, there’s the standard that I use to evaluate whether Rusty’s hair is long or short. Of course, there’s also in play my knowledge of what does and doesn’t count as fur, etc.

Now let’s get to this all a bit further. (What follows is a revision and expansion of the original article I wrote on this subject for the Frame’s Mutiperspectivialism entry on wikipedia.)

The Normative Perspective (i.e. law or standards that govern thought and action). In all of our actions there is some standard that serves as a guides us, for example, in telling us what is proper to question, what actions should we pursue and avoid, what the universe is really like, and how we should seek out knowledge. The marketplace of ideas is full of systems that compete for our acceptance, longing to set themselves up as god over our hearts and minds. For some people final allegiance is due to sense experience (“Seeing is believing”), their emotions (“If it doesn’t move me, it isn’t real.”), or political allegiances (“I couldn’t believe in a system that is so hostile to individual free speech”), for others it is their particular religious tradition (Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Ba’hai, etc) or secular philosophy (empiricism, rationalism, Marxism, etc.). Whatever serves as our final authority functions as our normative perspective.

Christians believe that God has verbally revealed Himself to mankind in Scripture, providing all the words from God that we need for life and godliness (cf. 2 Peter 1:3) God’s inspired word serves as the standard by which all truth claims are to be checked. God’s word dictates to us who He is, the true nature of the world around us, and who we as creatures are in relation to both Him and the world. As John Calvin has said, Scripture serves as the lenses through which we see everything. But even in knowing Scripture we know both the world, and ourselves and in knowing them both we come to know Scripture better.

The Situational Perspective (i.e. the object of knowledge). This perspective daws our attention to the facts of reality, i.e. the things our persons we are trying to know. With this perspective in mind, we should pay close attention to the details of history, science, and evidences for various beliefs. Yet science, history and the evidences are never to be interpreted in a fashion that ignores or sets aside the authoritative nature of the normative perspective. Remember, they’re all tied together.

Without an understanding of our world, we cannot understand or apply Scripture to our lives. An ethical example should help. The standard argument against abortion on demand is this:

1) Murder is a sin
2) Abortion on demand is murder
3) Therefore, Abortion on demand is a sin.

Point 1 provides us with the command of Scripture; it serves to provide us with a objective moral principal. But in order to arrive at point 3 we need to know whether or not abortion on demand is taking the life of an innocent unborn person. Coming to grips with the facts of abortion (the situational perspective) helps us to apply the command of God (the normative perspective). Our attention is drawn to the medical information on the nature of the unborn, the law of biogenesis, and the abortion procedure. Without this crucial information we could never know whether or not we where faithfully understanding God’s word as it applies to our lives.

The Existential Perspective (i.e. the knowing subject). This perspective draws our attention back to the person doing the knowing. As individuals, we bring our personal dispositions, temperaments, biases, presuppositions, and life experiences to every act of knowing. We ignore this crucial aspect of knowledge at the risk of constructing an unnatural, wooden, approach to knowing that is in conflict with the body-soul unity taught in Scripture. One of the nagging problems to epistemology is that when we’re trying to formulate a true-to-life approach to knowledge we are examining an action (“knowing”) that we perform almost every moment of our lives. While tacitly we perform these actions, putting then into carefully formulated propositions is quite tricky.

The approach that largely characterizes modernism is an epistemology that viewed the knowing enterprise as something hampered by human subjectivity in search of a sterile ”objective” mode of knowing. Frame notes that the search for a purely objective knowledge is not only impossible, but also idolatrous. He says,

Sometimes we dream fondly of a “purely objective” knowledge of God–a knowledge of God of freed from the limitations of our senses, minds, experiences, preparation, and so forth. But nothing of this sort is possible, and God does not demand that of us. Rather, He condescends to dwell in and with us, as in a temple. He identifies himself in and through our thoughts, ideas, and experiences. And that identification is clear; it is adequate for Christian certainty. A “purely objective” knowledge is precisely what we don’t want! Such knowledge would presuppose a denial of our creaturehood and thus a denial of God and of all truth. (DKG, 65)

The Integration of the perspectives. In order to appreciate the richness of the human knowing process we must see that every instance of knowing involves three perspectives. Esther Meek, following Frame closely, calls these perspectives ”the rules, the self, and the world.” (See her extremely helpful and fun book, Longing to Know: The Philosophy of Knowledge for Ordinary People) Emphasizing the existential perspective Meek states, ”Knowing is the responsible human struggle to rely on clues to focus on a coherent pattern and submit to its reality.” Viewed from the this perspective, knowing is the process of integration, where we focus on a pattern by and through the means of various clues, which she calls subsidiaries, in the world (i.e. the situational), our body-sense (the existential), and in our norms for thinking (the normative).

Much of the pattern-making process is hard to articulate, yet this more-than-words aspect of knowing cannot be ignored, for it is crucial in our common, everyday process of getting to know things and people. Through the integration process the clues now take on greater significance. No longer are they viewed as seemingly disconnected occurrences, but rather meaningful portions that make up a greater reality (Meek uses as a example a “magic eye” puzzle). Yet, in a very real sense the pattern or integration, once achieved, retroactively throws light on the subsidiaries that made it up. The particulars retain their meaningfulness, but one that is enhanced and transformed.

These patterns now shape us, because, ideally, they connect us with a reality independent of ourselves. We come to see the fullness of the pattern when it’s truth is lived in, habited, thus extending ourselves out into the world by means of it.

Hopefully in the near future I hope to expand on this a bit, pointing out what I think are the theological, and philosophical benefits to Frame’s approach.

Links on Dawkins

Here’s an excellent compilation of response’s to Richard Dawkins’ atheistic apologetics book, The God Delusion.

The Problem of Evil (Part 8, Conclusion)

CONCLUSION
We have spent the last entries taking a cursory look at the Problem of Evil. I have made what I feel were the necessary distinctions in order to approach the issue in a more precise manner. The warning was made that in addressing these various forms of the PE, we ought never to think we have removed all the mystery, and indeed terror, of the misery and suffering that people endure everyday in this broken world. Exhaustive answers as to why God has deemed it proper to allow sin and evil into His good creation are not forthcoming. Also, while I have denied the possibility of fully explaining God’s ways, I have defended the belief that the PE, in the multiple variations in which it appears, does not invalidate the rationality of Christian belief in God. In the process of defending this claim, we’ve looked at a handful of forms of the PE and found them wanting.

Lastly, we’ve turned the tables on the detractors of Christianity, and defended the notion that evil is actually indirect evidence for the God of Scripture. The dilemma of evil is addressed on every page of Scripture. Redemption itself is about the manner and process through which God delivers His creation from the misery brought about by the entrance of sin and evil into His good work. God does not address the “problem” in the way we would expect, and more often than not, our questions about particular occurrences of evil are left unanswered. But God has demonstrated His character in Scripture and calls us to trust him through the pain.

The Problem of Evil (Part 7)

When we view reality from the perspective given to us in the Bible, we find that it presents us with no philosophical Problem of Evil. That is not to say that, according to the Bible, our difficulties with evil do not arise from the suffering we endure living in this fallen world. There is a real sense in which the ”problem” lies in our emotional and psychological state. This, of course, is not to trivialize the traumatic impression made by encounters with evil.

The pain of losing a loved one often may cloud our judgment regarding God’s character. Likewise, the blinding emotional outrage of witnessing the killing fields of Rwanda can temporally disable us from thinking clearly about the truth-value of Christian theism. Yet, I’m not saying that the touch of evil only disables us. The Bible abundantly shows us a world filled with pain, and evil. We may be tempted to ignore the suffering of those outside of our own circles diminishing the intensity of their pain. But when we personally feel the sting of pain, suffering, and evil, our malaise is placed in proper perspective. As C. S. Lewis noted that evil is God’s megaphone to a morally deaf world (see his The Great Divorce, New York: Macmillan, 1946.) Evil cannot be ignored or denied.

The intensity of our experience of suffering is typically advanced by the fact that while we may believe in God, often our prayers, and answers in response to the “why” question, are not answered (at least not in the manner in which we desire). There is the mysterious “wait” and “dialectic” between evil and good (I got this notion from John Frame). We are called to trust God, though many times it seems as if He does not answer. Likewise, the dialectic reminds us daily that the righteous do not always prosper nor do the wicked always suffer. These experiences raise the existential or pastoral PE, the “How Long, O Lord” cries of the heart. This pain may lead us to doubt God’s word. But here a severe caution must be raised. “Beware of becoming the thing that you hate.” It was the doubt of God’s word as sufficient to direct our lives that originally ushered sin and evil into our world (Gen. 3).

THEODICY-LITE
We could rightly say that from one perspective the entire message of the Bible is one grand-scale answer to the problem of evil. The thrust of scripture points to the notion that had God destroyed creation after the entrance of sin and evil, Satan would have won. What we find is that God is not in favor of redemption from creation, but rather the redemption of creation. He has decreed that He would not defeat evil unilaterally, but from within the created order, by the seed of the woman (Gen. 3:15). As salvation history unfolds, the seed is identified with Abraham, then Judah, and finally with King David. In Christ, sin and evil do their worst, only to be conquered and made a spectacle of (Col. 2:15). The cross is indeed the “victory of God.” The ultimate triumph over evil came through a man, Jesus Christ (the Son of God).

Though most who raise the PE desire a top-down answer (some form of God waving a magic wand and making every evil go away), in this regard, God’s answer, the Biblical answer, is bottom up. God has deemed history, families, dominion, and ultimately the work of the Savior valuable. This is no gnostic answer to the PE. This is a gritty, hands-in-the-dirt God, who in the second Person of the Holy Trinity knows suffering like no other knows it.

Next I’ll wrap up this series with my conclusion…

The Problem of Evil (Part 6)

THE NON-CHRISTIAN PROBLEM OF EVIL
So far, we have looked at several forms of the PE, and have provided responses to demonstrate that they do not accomplish their goal (i.e. discrediting the rationality of Christian theism). This has been a defense of the coherence of theism, and primarily a negative apologetic (with the goal of removing road-blocks to Christian faith). Now I turn to an offensive apologetic, one that seeks to question the validity of the challenger’s position.

As we examine the charges against Christian theism, we can now ask if the unbeliever’s outrage at the evil in this world is an expression of personal distaste or whether the recent Virginia Tech shootings were objectively evil. If they object to this line of questioning, or deny that there exists objective ethical laws (laws which Cho Seung Hui violated) the Christian may respond, ”what has become of your original objection?” If evil does not exist, then it cannot be marshaled against the Christian conception of God.

Recall that in every form of the PE presented above, in some fashion it was posed that the existence of evil disproves the existence of the Christian God. The goal has been to show that this is not the case. Here we are faced with a linguistic problem for the non-Christian. We are left to ask, exactly what constitutes evil in a non-Christian framework? Without the infinite-personal God of the Bible, how do we define it? In fact, we are only left with two alternatives: either the non-Christian appeals to:

1) an individual subjectivist response, and

2) a collective subjectivist response.

For the sake of handling the various possible replies I have distinguished the alternatives. However, as we will soon see, both alternatives reduce to subjectivism and skepticism.

Individual subjectivist responses. If the non-Christian claims moral justification is found in what one chooses to do, we are left with no standard by which we can condemn the worst types of behavior. Pedophilia, rape, incest, bestiality, and murder, and all morally acceptable. Why? Because for those that commit such acts, they were the products of active volition.

Collective subjectivist responses. The term “collective subjectivist” may strike some as paradoxical at best and oxymoronic at worst, yet such a title is fitting for “society says” moral relativism. According to this position, morality is, in a weak sense, objective in that the individual is not free to create moral norms from scratch. They are to live within the ethical structure of societal consensus. Such an ethical standard is collective. Yet, on the other hand, it nevertheless remains a subjectivist position on meta-ethics. What makes the collective approach ultimately subjectivist and indeed relativist is that each society determines it’s own moral norms, and accordingly, one culture (or sub-culture) cannot condemn the actions of another.

The problems for this approach are equally evident. If indeed no supra-cultural definition of evil (or good) exists, how can two or more cultures or sub-cultures with different standards of ethics co-exists. Consistently applied, the collectivist subjectivist model prohibits us form labeling the crimes committed at Auschwitz evil. In fact, it becomes even more problematic because not all German citizens would have approved of the war crimes and genocide of the Nazis. So, what we are left with is at least two moral sub-cultures in WWII Germany, those that would call the Nazi actions evil, and those who participated in those actions and condoned them. But any system that strips us of the ability to make moral distinctions is highly counter-intuitive. A paradigm that seeks to explain our “moral motions” must respect the moral outrage we feel at events such as the holocaust.

Next we’ll look at the problem with these approaches…

The Problem of Evil (Part 5)

THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The most common apologetic tactic taken by Christians in reply to the PE is known as the free will defense (FWD hereafter). This position was held by the earlier Augustine , defended by Alvin Plantinga in contemporary analytic philosophy, and expounded by Norman L. Geisler in popular evangelical apologetic works. In summary form, the FWD asserts that God cannot create “genuinely” free creatures and avoid the existence of evil. Now a word of clarification is necessary here. According to the point of view presented in the FWD “genuine” freedom is defined in terms of what is referred to as libertarian freedom. R. K. McGregor defines libertarian freedom as,

[T]he belief that the human will has an inherent power to choose with equal ease between alternatives. This is commonly called the “power of contrary choice” or “the liberty of indifference.” This belief does not claim that there are no influences that might affect the will, but it does insist that normally the will can overcome these factors and choose in spite of them. Ultimately, the will is free from any necessary causation. In other words, it is autonomous from outside determination. (Quoted in John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2001. Pg. 120)

The FWD argues that true love cannot be “forced,” but instead must be the response toward God by free creatures. Yet God also knows that in a world inhabited by free moral agents that evil is possible (recall that freedom, in the sense in which argument assumes, entails that a moral agent has the equal ability either to choose or refuse a given course of action). Since God has endowed humans with libertarian freedom, humans may choose to act in ways that are contrary to God’s intended purposes. In order for God to enter into personal, loving relationships He must preserve this freedom even though, through its misuse, humans are capable of monstrous evil.

Therefore, if God is to preserve libertarian freedom, the possibility of evil must remain. According to proponents of this theodicy, God’s goodness is preserved, and our freedom is maintained. In the words of Geisler,

God then is responsible for the possibility of free choice, but we must bear the responsibility for the actuality of it. (Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, pg. 219)

A critique of the FWD. While at first glance, and especially on Plantinga’s model, the FWD sufficiently addresses the logical PE, I find it to be inadequate. Why? The difficulty rises when we realize that we are looking for more than merely logical answers, but rather true answers. As discussed earlier, in order for a defense to be presented as a true Christian defense, it must be:

1) derived from the texts of scripture, and

2) be logical and rationally defendable.

Unfortunately, the FWD presupposes a libertarian view of the human will, which not only is philosophically implausible , but more importantly, unscriptural and in opposition to cardinal Christian doctrines (original sin, the inspiration of Scripture, etc). If libertarian freedom doesn’t really exist, then in what meaningful way should we present it as a true rebuttal to the PE?

[For a short and incisive critique of libertarian freedom, from both theological and philosophical perspectives, see John Frame, No Other God, 122-131]

Libertarian free will also rules out a robust doctrine of God’s free and sovereign rule over all of His creation (cf. Eph 1:11). Thus, the FWD, in an attempt to defend the Biblical God against the PE has actually diminished the power, wisdom, and goodness of God at the cost of appeasing the unbeliever. God’s control over His creation in limited by will of the creature. His goodness is lessened in that by not making the display of the full array of His attributes the ultimate object of praise for His people He thereby diminishes their ultimate joy. And His wisdom stifled by creating a world in which so much purposeless evil occurs that could have been avoided.

The Problem of Evil (Part 4)

The Deductive Problem of Evil (hereafter DPE) is probably the most well known form of de jure objections to Christianity, i.e. it challenges the very rationality of our faith. The classic presentation of this argument is from the pen of David Hume,

Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. It is from the intention of the deity? But her is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so the clear, so decisive… (Quoted in Platinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, pg. 10.)

The best known contemporary formulation was argued by J. L. Mackie. According to Mackie, “…it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positive irrational, that the essential parts of the theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another.” ( “Evil and Omnipotence,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell. London: Oxford, 1971, pg. 92) This is a serious charge. And if true, it undermines the very credibility of the Christian faith at its very core. But what is the DPE, formally stated? According to Ronald Nash, “[t]he problem arises because of a supposed contradiction that lies in the following six propositions:

1) God exists
2) God is omnipotent
3) God is omniscient
4) God is omnibenevolent
5) God created the world
6) Evil exists”
(Taken from “The Problem of Evil,” To Everyone an Answer: A Case for the Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004, pg. 214)

There is said to be something contradictory about one individual holding all these points at the same time. The argument has also been formulated in this way manner:

1) If God is good and loves all human beings, it is reasonable to believe that He wants to deliver the creatures he loves from evil and suffering.

2) If God is all-knowing, it is reasonable to believe that He knows how to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering.

3) If God is all-powerful, it is reasonable to believe that He is able to deliver his creatures from evil and suffering. (Taken from Nash, Worldviews in Conflict. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992, pg. 94)

But Alvin Plantinga has pointed out that nothing in the syllogism constrains us to believed that Christian theism is rationally unwarranted. Nothing here leads us to believed that Christians hold to a contradiction. Perhaps if the proposition “God must stop evil as soon as it happens” is inserted the atheologians goal is achieved. But no Christian holds this.

In order for the non-Christian objector to successfully argue the DPE, they must insert a proposition that contradicts the others, and one that Christians affirm. Plantinga has found a proposition that all Christian affirm, and that once and for all precludes the possibility of the DPE hitting its mark. The proposition is “God created a world that now contains evil and had a good reason for doing so.” The DPE is now solved:

1) God exists
2) God is omnipotent
3) God is omniscient
4) God is omnibenevolent
5) God created a world that now contains evil and had a good reason for doing so
6) Evil exists

Christians affirm all these points and find no contradiction. In light of Plantinga’s treatment, Mackie himself conceded that the DPE “does not, after all, shows that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.” (The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pg. 154)

Next we’ll look at a standard Christian response to the PE, the free will defense…

The Problem of Evil (Part 3)

Unfortunately, several authors have conceded that an “answer” to the Problem of Evil (PE) is not possible this side of heaven (such as John Frame in his Apologetics to the Glory of God). Since we cannot provide a reason or rationale for why God allows particular evils, we need to admit that the reality of evil is a mystery for Christians as well as non-Christians. Scripture does provide us with enough to trust God’s character and plan until we know more on the issue. Also, the Holy Spirit gives us a new heart in order to trust God’s purposes through the gospel.

My chief contention with this position is that it has implicitly accepted an enormously large burden of proof. A sufficient manner of addressing the PE need not be an exhaustive answer; such a standard is much too high. Here I do not purpose to close all doors to the PE, for to do so would undermine my true goal.

DE FACTO AND DE JURE OBJECTIONS
We have seen that the PE can rightly be broken down into two forms, the theoretical, and the practical. Now, let’s look at another distinction within the theoretical PE, the de facto objection, and the de jure objection. Those who raise the de facto objection seek an answer as to why God allows evil in general, and the multiplicity of evils in specific. Plantinga defines the de facto objection as, “objections to the truth of Christian belief.” In contrast, the de jure objectors question the very rationality of Christian theism in light of evil. Does the presence of evil rule out the Christian definition of God? Again, Plantinga defines for us the de jure objection,

these are arguments or claims to the effect that Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any rate unjustifiable, or rationally unjustified, or irrational, or not intellectually respectable, or contrary to sound morality, or without sufficient evidence, or in some other way rationally unacceptable, not up to snuff from an intellectual point of view. (Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pg. viii)

My goal here is to address the de jure PE and briefly touch upon the de facto. So this piece is mostly defense, with a touch of theodicy-lite.

While it is important to distinguish between these forms of the theoretical PE, we must carefully steer clear of neatly separating them. The de facto objection often poses such a serious crisis of faith in many, that it may cause some to question the very rationality of Christian truth claims.

Next we’ll take a look at the Deductive PE…

The Problem of Evil (Part 2)

In the first entry, I mentioned that speaking of just one Problem of Evil (PE) is problematic and should be avoided. A second problem with speaking of only one PE stems from the fact that evil poses us difficulty in a number of ways. There is the evidential problem of evil, the logical problem, and the pastoral problem. In fact, each of these aspects of the problem can further be distinguished and sub-divided in to smaller “problems.” However, this plurality of forms to the particular objection to theistic belief shouldn’t overwhelm us. Rather than providing an insurmountable obstacle for faith, dissecting the problem into many forms aids handling each form with meticulous attention.

For the sake of categorization, I will divide the various ways in which the pie can be cut down to a mere two: the theoretical problem (which consists of the evidential and logical problems of evil), and the practical problem of evil (which consists of the pastoral problem). The chief purpose of this essay is apologetic in nature and hence will not substantially address the practical dilemma of personal suffering.

Alvin Plantinga, in his book God, Freedom, and Evil, has helpfully made the distinction between theodicy and defense. The objective of a theodicy is to provide an explanation and rational for why an omniscient and omnipotent God has allowed evil into His good creation. By way of contrast, a defense is more modest in its goals. The objective of a theistic defense to the problem of evil, hereafter PE, is simply to demonstrate that the presence of evil does not rule out the existence of God.

As mentioned earlier, I hope to sketch out here what I believe is a faithful defense of the belief in the Christian God. Yet, this is not an easy task. Those convinced of the Bible’s truth are not (and dare I say, should not be) concerned with the defense of merely the belief in a god. Instead, the God whose existence we reject as incompatible with the presence of evil is the Trinitarian God revealed in both the Old and New Testament. Thus, we are in the precarious position of defending “whole-Bible” Christianity rather than generic theism. No response to the PE is acceptable that compromises the richness of Christianity’s doctrinal matrix.

Historical Ignorance

Here’s a random quote that I thought was on the money:

Despite people who speak…of “earlier and simpler times”, all that makes earlier times seem simpler is our ignorance of their complexities.

Thomas Sowell (writer for the New York Post)

The Problem of Evil (Part 1)

Traditionally, in the study of the Philosophy of Religion, a dilemma has been raised regarding the coherence of theism called “the problem of evil.” This “problem” sets out to demonstrate that the existence, degree, and intensity of suffering and evil in the world make the existence of a loving, all-powerful, all-wise God impossible (or at least highly unlikely). Here in this series, I’ll address this objection to the Christian worldview.

One point must be noted early in our discussion. As John S. Feinberg notes in his work, The Many Faces of Evil, there does not exist simply one problem of evil. While we can safely speak of the difficulties that arise in our attempted reconciliations between our concept of God and the existence of evil in general, once we ask how specifically we are to define terms like “God,” “omnipotence,” “evil,” etc, we find that no one formulation of the “problem” fits all religious systems. A Mormon must reconcile the existence of evil (however they define evil) with their particular doctrine of God, and the same is true for the Muslim, the process theologian, the pantheist, the evangelical Arminian, and the classical Calvinist. So, one way of denying the existence of the problem of evil is to say that no two philosophical/theological systems wrestle with exactly the same dilemma.

Here I intend to address the problems posed by the existence of evil to distinctively Protestant and evangelical, and Reformed doctrine of God. My goal is both bold and modest. It is bold in that I hope to briefly discuss why I believe the various forms of the Problem of Evil (hereafter PE) covered here are no threat to biblical theism. The theist may confidently maintain their belief in God in the face of these challenges. Yet, my goal is also modest, in that I do not necessarily intend on offering a theodicy explaining why God allows particular acts of evil (other than in the broadest theological terms). Such I believe cannot be done and is, in fact, presumptuous. I merely seek in these next few (or not so few?) entries to do as many of the Church fathers sort to do with another mystery of the Christian faith, Christ’s incarnation. They realized that the mystery of how God come become man was just that, a mystery. Yet they also corrected errors taught by others that were not biblical. That is to say, they hemmed in the types of answers given to this question (How could God become man?), ruling out bad answers, but didn’t provide exact formulations for answering it.

Next we’ll look at various types of the PE.